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ABSTRACT: We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. A firm has 
monopoly power in one market but faces competition by a second firm in another market. We 
compare treatments where the monopolist can bundle its two products to treatments where it 
cannot, and we contrast simultaneous and sequential order of moves. Our data indicate support 
for the theory of product bundling, even though substantial payoff differences between players 
exist. With bundling and simultaneous moves, the monopolist offers the predicted number of 
units. When the monopolist is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained 
with bundling although in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum: bundling 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the key results in experimental economics is that subjects dislike payoff asymmetries. 
This has been observed, for example, in ultimatum games (Güth et al., 1982), dictator games 
(Forsythe et al., 1994), trust games (Berg et al., 1995) and gift-exchange games (Fehr et al., 
1993). In these experiments, a considerable share of participants sacrifices money in order to 
obtain more equitable outcomes. A growing literature explains this by allowing for other-
regarding motives in players’ utility functions (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000).  
In the field of Industrial Organization (IO), asymmetric outcomes are ubiquitous and 
therefore, more often than not, experimental support for these theories is weak. In theory, 
structural differences, including cost and capacity asymmetries, and a sequential order of moves 
(Stackelberg leadership and other forms of strategic commitments) yield asymmetric equilibria 
where one player earns considerably more than others. Experimental data typically refute these 
theoretical predictions. In experiments with Cournot competition and asymmetric costs, Mason 
et al. (1992) observe industry output averaging above the Nash equilibrium prediction and that 
high-cost firms produce more than predicted. Keser (1993) observes payoff differences that are 
smaller than predicted in a Cournot duopoly with cost differences and demand inertia. 
Stackelberg followers produce more than what theory predicts, presumably to discipline leader’s 
behaviour (Huck et al., 2001, 2002). In a Bertrand-Edgeworth setting with asymmetric 
capacities, Fonseca and Normann (2008) find that median prices and price distributions are 
pretty much alike among the different firm types, in violation of the mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium which entails considerable pay-off differences. And for a duopoly game with 
endogenous quality choices, Henze and Schuett (2011) find that products tend to be of equal 
quality, while theory unambiguously predicts maximal differentiation whereby the high quality 
supplier earns significantly more than the supplier of the low quality product. 
While at odds with standard IO theory, the experimental results are often well explained 
by models of other-regarding preferences. The behavior of Stackelberg followers for example 
can be rationalised when players have Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences (see the theory 
papers by Santos-Pinto, 2008, and Lau and Leung, 2010), or when they are considered to act 
reciprocally (Cox et al., 2007). And inequality aversion can explain why players often achieve 
equal profits in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly (Iris and Santos-Pinto, 2010).  3
In this paper, we examine asymmetric outcomes in duopoly experiments that involve 
product bundling. In the literature, product bundling is typically analyzed for an asymmetric 
industry: a firm with monopoly power in one market faces competition by a second firm in 
another market. Offering its two products as a bundle allows the multiproduct firm to leverage its 
monopoly power to the market where it faces a rival. Its market share in the duopolistic market 
will increase, possibly at the expense of losing some customers in the monopoly market, even if 
demand is independent across the two markets (Martin, 1999; Nalebuff, 2004). That is, bundling 
allows the multiproduct firm to credibly commit to a larger output on the duopoly market. As 
such, a bundling strategy mainly reduces the profits of the second firm or deters entry altogether. 
Given subjects’ alleged aversion to asymmetric payoffs, equilibrium predictions for product 
bundling are not likely to be observed in lab experiments. 
Van Damme et al. (2009, p. 107) review the experimental literature on abusive practices 
in general and conclude that “little experimental work has been done in this area”. Indeed, our 
paper is part of the small but increasing experimental literature on abusive market practices. 
Pioneering on abuses of dominant positions is Isaac and Smith’s (1985) experimental work on 
predatory pricing (see also Goeree et al., 2004). Recent work in this area includes experimental 
analyses of vertical foreclosure (Martin et al., 2001), exclusive dealing (Landeo and Spier, 2009, 
Boone et al., 2009, Smith, 2011), and price discrimination (Normann et al., 2007). The only 
existing experimental paper on bundling we are aware of is by Caliskan et al. (2007). Their focus 
is, however, how a fringe competitor in the monopoly market affects welfare. In a posted-offer-
market setting, they find that the fringe seller increases the consumer surplus while decreasing 
the seller surplus, and that the fringe seller does not affect the consumer surplus extracted from 
the bundle despite a decrease in the bundle transaction price. 
The basis of our experiments is a quantity-setting framework where one firm is an 
uncontested monopolist in one market and a duopolist in a second, unrelated market. In the 
bundling treatments, the multiproduct firm bundles its products for the two markets. We compare 
the results from this treatment to a baseline treatment without the bundling opportunity. Thus our 
first treatment variable is “bundling” vs. “no bundling”. 
The second treatment variable is the sequence of moves: simultaneous vs. sequential. We 
introduce this second treatment variable in order to examine explicitly the commitment value of 
product bundling (as highlighted by Whinston, 1990, Choi, 1998, and Nalebuff, 2004). With  4
simultaneous-move Cournot competition, the bundling firm trades off reduced sales in its 
monopoly market to increased output in the duopoly market. The bundling strategy works as a 
commitment to sell more in the competitive segment. But of course, ex post, the monopolist 
would want to deviate from this outcome and would want to best respond against the second 
firm. In the Stackelberg setting, when both markets have an identical demand and cost structure, 
bundling does not require additional commitments as the monopolist is a first mover anyhow. 
That is, bundling does not affect optimal quantities in theory. This feature allows us to test if 
bundling gives the Stackelberg leader additional (and unpredicted) commitment power because, 
as it is known from previous experiments, absent bundling, Stackelberg leaders find it difficult to 
gain from their first-mover advantage (Huck et al., 2001, 2002, Fonseca et al., 2004, Müller, 
2006).  
Our results support the theory of product bundling to a large extent, which is remarkable 
in light of the received experimental literature yielding little support for asymmetric outcomes. 
First, in the Cournot setting without bundling, firms play roughly symmetric Cournot-Nash 
outputs in the duopoly market, even though the multiproduct firm has substantial additional 
earnings in its monopoly market. These payoff differences have little impact, however, on the 
outcomes in the duopoly market. Second, when the multiproduct firm bundles its products with 
simultaneous moves, it offers the number of bundles predicted by theory. The single product 
competitor produces more than predicted, but substantial payoff differences remain. In fact, 
bundling increases the difference in payoffs. Third, when the multiproduct firm is the 
Stackelberg leader but cannot bundle, the previously observed non-equilibrium behaviour of the 
followers maintains: Stackelberg followers substantially produce more than predicted, effectively 
reducing the Stackelberg leader’s first-mover advantage. Fourth, the predicted asymmetric 
equilibrium in the sequential-move case of Stackelberg with product bundling is closely attained 
in the lab. We observe very large payoffs asymmetries, which are larger than under Stackelberg 
competition absent bundling. In sum, we find that bundling successfully works as a commitment 
device, which is robust with respect to the order of moves (simultaneous or sequential). It is thus 
a means of transferring market power from one market to another, which suggest that bundling is 
a practice of (abuse of) dominance. 
    Our results raise two questions pertinent to behavioral economics and the debate about 
payoff inequality aversion. First, why do our no-bundling treatments confirm previous duopoly  5
experiments even though in previous studies the extra monopoly payoff does not exist and the 
payoff inequality is much smaller?
1 In Section 5, we argue that this is actually consistent with 
models of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt’s, 1999). The 
reason is that the multiproduct firm’s profits in the monopoly market does not affect the marginal 
costs and benefits of ‘punishment’ (that is, producing more than the standard best reply) by the 
single-product firm in the duopoly market. Second, why are the results in the Stackelberg 
bundling treatment better in line with the prediction than the no-bundling treatment, even though 
it yields greater payoff inequalities? The answer lies in the possibility to commit to an output 
level through product bundling. A non-bundling monopolist can give in to “punishing” behavior 
of the smaller firm by producing less. But a bundling monopolist loses additional payoff from 
such concessions and is thus less likely to reduce output. This is anticipated by the small firms 
who punish less. Intentions therefore seem to matter: because the bundling firm is merely 
maximizing the monopoly profit in its home market, the intentions of this kind of behaviour may 
not be seen as hostile towards the duopolist. Indeed, a non-bundling Stackelberg leader can 
freely earn monopoly rents in its home market and is not “forced” to produce the Stackelberg 
leader quantity on the duopoly market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive several 
theoretical predictions, followed by an outline of the experimental design and procedure in 
Section 3. The experimental results are in Section 4. In Section 5 we briefly discuss our results 
and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  MODEL AND PREDICTIONS 
The Cournot model underlying our experiments has two firms, 1 and 2, and two markets, D and 
M, where ‘D’ and ‘M’ stand for ‘duopoly’ and ‘monopoly’ respectively. We assume that in both 
markets inverse demand is linear, such that  12
D DDD p dqq and  12
M MMM p dqq  , and 
identical across markets:  DM ddd  . Both firms produce at constant marginal cost of c.  
                                                 
1 Despite the myriads of economics experiments exploring issues of fairness and inequality, we have not been able 
to find an experiment that tackles the issue of a fixed additional payoff for one player. Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008) 
investigate ultimatum games with various outside options for proposers and responders. These outside options are 
only relevant when responders reject. Out setting would be comparable to an ultimatum game where the proposer 
earns an additional amount of money regardless of the responders’ actions.    6
In market D, firm 1 and firm 2 are Cournot duopoly competitors. In market M, firm 1 is a 
monopolist; hence  2 0 M q  . Firm 1 will sometimes be referred to as the monopolist or the multi-
product firm whereas firm 2 will occasionally also be labeled the duopolist.  
 
Cournot - no bundling 
Suppose first that there is no bundling, that is, output decisions in markets D and M are 
independent. In this case, we obtain the following profit function for firm 1 
(1)   11 2 1 1 1 () ( ) DD D M M dq q c q dq c q      , 
while firm 2’s profit function is 
(2)   21 2 2 () DD D dq q c q    . 
For market D, the unique Cournot Nash equilibrium is 
(3)   12 () / 3 DD qq d c   , 
and equilibrium profits are  
2
12 /9 DD dc    . The monopoly solution for market M is 
(4)   1 () / 2
M qd c  ,  
and the monopoly profit is  
2
1 /4 M dc   . 
 
Cournot - bundling 
Now consider the bundling case. Bundling implies that firm 1 can credibly commit to produce its 
output for both markets in a fixed proportion. Without loss of generality we assume that this ratio 
is one to one (see also Martin, 1999): for each unit of  1
D q , one unit of  1
M q  will be produced such 
that we can simply state  11 1
DM qqq  . Accordingly, in the bundling case, firm 1’s profit 
function is 
(5)   11 11 2 1 () ( ) D dq c q dq q c q     , 
while firm 2’s profits equal 
(6)   21 2 2 ()
DD dq q c q    .  7
The best-reply functions then follow:  12 2 () ( / 2) / 2 DD qq d q c   and  21 1 ()( ) / 2 D qq dqc  . 
Nash equilibrium outputs (bundles) are 
(7)  1 3( ) / 7 qd c  ,  2 2( )/7
D qd c  , 
and Nash profits are  2
1 18( ) / 49 dc    and 2
1 4( ) / 49 dc   . 
Firm 1’s equilibrium output of  1 3( ) / 7 qd c   satisfies  1 () / 3 () / 2 dc q dc   . That 
is, the optimal output with bundling is larger than the Cournot duopoly solution but smaller than 
the monopoly output. For firm 2, we get  2 2( )/7 ( )/3 D qd c d c    . Hence, bundling increases 
firm 1’s profits while it reduces the profits of firm 2. 
 
Stackelberg – no bundling 
If firm 1 cannot bundle but is the first mover in market D, we obtain the Stackelberg duopoly 
solution. Profit functions are as in the Cournot case but firm 1 has a first-mover advantage such 
that equilibrium outputs become 
(8)   1 () / 2 D qd c  ,  2 () / 4 D qd c  . 
Profits are  2
1 () / 8 D dc   and  2
2 () / 1 6 D dc   . The monopoly solution for market M is as 
above in the Cournot case with  1 () / 2
M qd c  and  2
1 () / 4
M dc   . 
 
Stackelberg – bundling 
Suppose firm 1 can bundle its two products and that it is the first mover in market D. It is 
straightforward to see that we then obtain the same equilibrium as in the Stackelberg case absent 
bundling. Indeed, without bundling a Stackelberg leader in market D produces the same output 
as the monopolist in market M, given identical demand and cost structures across markets. 
    Hence, with our design we can explore specifically the commitment value of product 
bundling, both in case of simultaneous moves (where product bundling should affect quantity 




3.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
We developed a two-by-two treatment design. The two treatment variables are bundling / no 
bundling, and Cournot / Stackelberg. Table 1 summarizes the treatment design and treatment 
labels. 
 
Table 1:  Treatments and treatment labels 
 No  Bundling  Bundling 
Cournot NOBUNDCOUR B UNDCOUR 
Stackelberg NOBUNDSTACK B UNDSTACK
 
We implemented the above model by giving subjects a payoff table, which was derived 
from the model using parameter values d = 54 and c = 6. Subjects had to choose integer 
quantities between 9 and 27.
2 In each session, half the subjects played the role of the firm 1, the 
other half played the role of firm 2. These roles remained fixed for the entire course of the 
experiment. The experimental markets were repeated over 15 periods, and subjects knew the 
number of periods from the instructions (see the Appendix, Section A). In each period, subjects 
were randomly matched (“strangers” design).  
    In the instructions, subjects were told that they would act as a firm which, together with 
another firm serves a market, and that one firm gained some additional business in a second 
market. In all treatments, subjects received feedback about what happened in their market at the 
end of each round. The computer screen displayed the output decision of both duopolists in 
market D and also firm 1’s output in market M. Feedback on profits was given about firm i’s 
own payoff. The information feedback after each period, the instructions (which were also read 
aloud) and the payoff table, ensured common knowledge of the rules of the game. After having 
read the instructions, participants could privately ask questions. Before the start of the 
experiment subjects were asked to answer several control questions. 
                                                 
2The payoff table gives all necessary details of the model while avoiding formulae, parameters and technical terms. 
In the experiment, we rescaled the strategy space such that subjects had to choose a number between 1 and 19. As 
subjects are unfamiliar with the model, the labels of the actions are meaningless to them. Further, as is well known 
(Holt, 1985), payoff tables with integer choices sometimes have not unique best replies. Whenever necessary, we 
manipulated the payoff table in minor details such that all best replies are unique.  9
The experiments were computerized (Fischbacher, 1999) and conducted at CenterLab 
of Tilburg University. For each treatment, 32 subjects participated in total. Subjects were 
randomly matched within groups of eight participants but subjects were not informed about this. 
Hence, we have four independent observations for each treatment. Sessions usually had 16 
participants but in two cases we had to reduce the session size to eight because insufficiently 
many subjects showed up. Participants were students from various departments, many from 
fields other than economics or business administration. The monetary payment was computed by 
using an exchange rate of 500 “points” for one Euro and adding a flat payment of 5 Euros.
3
 
Subjects’ average earnings were 25.27 Euros including the flat payment. Sessions lasted between 
60 and 75 minutes. 
 
 
4.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the average quantities in the four treatments. The three average quantities are 
firm 1’s (the monopolist’s) output in market D ( 1
D q ), firm 2’s output in market D ( 2
D q ), and firm 
1’s output in market M ( 1
M q , which is equal to  1
D q  in the bundling treatments). The table also 
reports the predictions and the 95% confidence intervals. The asterisks next to the inequality 
signs indicate whether the differences observed are significant according to an exact non-
parametric ranksum tests (Wilcoxon, Mann-Whitney).
4
 
We start the discussion with the no bundling treatments. First, in the Cournot markets 
without bundling, the average quantities are pretty much the predicted values, as has been 
observed earlier (Holt 1985; Huck et al., 2001). Here, both firms produce only slightly more than 
the predicted number of units, but there are no economically or statistically meaningful 
differences between firms and the predictions are contained in the 95% confidence interval. 
Also, in the monopoly market, the multiproduct firm produces about the monopoly output. 
Effectively, our data confirm the theoretical predictions and previous experimental results. 
 
 
                                                 
3 This payment was made since subjects could have made losses in the experiment. 
4 Section B of the Appendix lists all per-period quantities for each individual matching group  10
 
Table 2:  Average quantities 
  market D, firm 1  market D, firm 2  market M, firm 1 
  
1
D q       
2
D q     
1
M q    





































**    
**  
**    
*      
** 

































Notes: NB = No bundling, B = Bundling. Predictions are in italics, 95% confidence intervals (based on simple linear 
regressions that are clustered at the group level) are in square brackets. Significance levels of inequality comparisons 




* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Second, in the NOBUNDSTACK treatment, the theory fails. This finding has been 
documented earlier (Huck et al. 2001, 2002). In the duopoly market, the Stackelberg followers 
produce more than predicted, the Stackelberg leaders produce less. The results are very similar to 
Huck et al. (2001), a finding we come back to in Section 5. The two papers use linear demand 
and cost for their payoffs tables but have different demand and cost values. Hence, we compare 
the results by taking the ratio of observed output levels and predictions. In Huck et al. (2001), 
Stackelberg followers produce 100% × 8.32/6.00 = 139% of the predicted output level and 
Stackelberg leaders produce 100% × 10.19/12.00 = 85% of the prediction. For our data, these 
figures read 100% × 15.58/12 = 130% and 100% × 19.00/24.00 = 79%, respectively. While both 
Stackelberg leaders and followers produce relatively less in our data, it is probably fair to say 
that these ratios are of a similar magnitude. At the same time, firm 1 produces roughly the 
monopoly output in market M.  11
    While the Cournot and Stackelberg no-bundling results confirm previous experiments, 
this confirmation is, at least at first sight, surprising. Recall that in our experiments the 
multiproduct firms earn extra monopoly profit in market M, causing rather large payoff 
differences. Given that subjects dislike payoff asymmetries, a-priori it is not clear whether our 
data would confirm the single-market settings as analyzed in Huck et al. (2001). We will also get 
back to this point in Section 5.  
 
Result 1. In the no bundling treatments, the data confirm the predictions in the Cournot markets, 
and reject the predictions in the Stackelberg markets. Both findings confirm previous 
experimental results despite the fact that the payoff inequality is substantially higher in our 
design due to the addition of the monopoly market. 
 
    We now turn to the bundling treatments. In the Cournot sessions, firm 1 produces slightly 
less than the predicted 20 units, but the prediction is well within the 95% confidence interval 
around the average output (19.42). Firm 2 produces 15.42, more than the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium quantity of 14 but this value is inside the 95% confidence interval. By and large, and 
despite a substantial payoff difference, the asymmetric equilibrium in market D prevails. 
In BUNDSTACK, the output levels are much closer to the prediction than in the 
Stackelberg treatment without bundling. Stackelberg leaders now produce only two output units 
less than predicted (92% of the predicted output), as compared to the five units under production 
absent bundling. Stackelberg followers produce roughly 1.6 units more than predicted (113% of 
the prediction), as opposed to 3.6 units more than predicted (130% of the equilibrium value) 
without bundling. Overall, with sequential moves, product bundling brings average outputs much 
closer to the theoretical prediction.  
 
Result 2. In the bundling treatments, the data confirm the predictions reasonably well in the 
Cournot treatment, although firm 2 produces more than predicted. In the Stackelberg treatment 
with bundling, the deviation from the theoretical benchmark is much smaller than in the no 
bundling treatment. 
  12
    Next, we turn to the comparison of the bundling and no bundling data: what is the effect 
of product bundling? It turns out that bundling has a similar effect in the Cournot and the 
Stackelberg treatments: the multi-product firm significantly increases its output in the duopolistic 
market at the expense of losing some customers in the market where it holds a monopoly, and the 
single-product firm adapts to this increased output by significantly reducing its supply. That is, 
through product bundling an asymmetric outcome emerges. Although this finding is in line with 
theory, it is in sharp contrast to the many experimental studies that fail to find support for 
asymmetric equilibria in the lab, in particular the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 
Result 3. The effect of product bundling is similar in the Cournot and Stackelberg treatments: 
the multi-product firm supplies more to the duopolistic market and less to the market where it 
holds a monopoly; the single-product firm produces less.  
 
    Finally, Figure 1 suggests that there are no time trends in our data. Indeed, even if we 
ignore the possible dependence between observations within sessions and treat each decision as 













                                                 
5 Spearman’s rho is always smaller than 0.1 and not significant for all treatments and all three output decisions.  
6 An interesting evolution over time can be observed for firm 2 in NOBUNDSTACK. One interpretation is that 
subjects initialy punish the Stackelberg leaders strategically despite the random matching scheme, but then give up 
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5.  DISCUSSION 
The previous section shows that our results are roughly consistent with the theory in three of the 
four treatments and it fails in one case (NOBUNDSTACK). This raises two questions. First, why do 
our no-bundling results confirm previous duopoly experiments even though the extra monopoly 
payoff does not exist and the payoff inequality is much smaller in the previous studies? Second, 
why are the results in the bundling treatments better in line with the prediction than in the no- 14
bundling case even though this implies even greater payoff inequalities?
7 Putting this more 
generally, why does inequality aversion have – apparently – no bite in the bundling treatments, 




    Consider question one. In models of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the additional profit of the multiproduct firm reduces players’ utilities 
compared to standard duopolies. However, the marginal change in utility from the duopolist 
producing more than predicted is the same in both the regular duopolies and our multiproduct 
setup. The reason is that the output chosen in the duopoly market does not affect the payoff 
difference in the monopoly market. The amount produced by firm 2 in NOBUNDSTACK compared 
to the prediction is, therefore, very similar to the figures observed in the Stackelberg duopolies of 
Huck et al. (2001), as noted above. This behavior is consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
because the utility-maximizing output choice (balancing the marginal cost of producing more 
than the standard best reply and the marginal gain of reducing the payoff inequality) is the same 
in both cases. A similar argument explains why our multiproduct firms in NOBUNDSTACK 
produce similar amounts as in the standard Stackelberg duopolies in Huck et al. (2001). 
    Second, why are the results in the Stackelberg bundling treatment better in line with the 
prediction than in the no-bundling case, despite greater payoff inequalities? In BUNDSTACK, 
there is now a link between the two markets because product bundling makes  1
M   a function of 
1
D q  as well. In particular, it is more costly for firm 1 to reduce its output: any reduction in output 
on market D causes losses in the monopoly market. Not surprisingly, we observe that in market 
D firm 1 produces significantly more (22.08) with bundling than without (19.00). This behavior 
is consistent with inequality aversion because it reflects the cost of reducing the inequality on the 
                                                 
7 Let us make precise the statement that the multi-product firm earns more than the single-product firm. In 
NOBUNDCOUR, the multi-product firm is predicted to earn 576 in the monopoly market, and both firms should earn 
256 in the duopoly market; thus, the multi-product firm is predicted to earn 3.3 times more than the duopolist. In 
both Stackelberg treatments, the leader (follower) is predicted to earn 288 (144) in the duopoly market plus 576 for 
the multi-product firm; hence, the multi-product firm is predicted to earn 6 times as much. The observed average 
profit ratio (multi-product firm profit over single-product firm profits) ranges from 3.3 (NOBUNDCOUR) to 5.1 
(BUNDSTACK). These payoff differences are substantial indeed.  
8 We focus here on the Stackelberg treatments as both Cournot treatments are consistent with what theory predicts.  15
part of the multiproduct firm. More intriguing is the finding that firm 2’s behavior also changes. 
What we observe in BUNDSTACK is that, even though the multiproduct firm produces more than 
in NOBUNDSTACK, firm 2 reduces it punishment behavior (that is, it reduces the amount of 
excess output it produces on top of its best reply). In fact, the standard best reply to the 
Stackelberg leaders’ average output (12.96) is not too distant from the actual average output of 
13.59. Moreover, in BUNDSTACK firm 2 plays more often the standard best reply (222 of 480 
cases, or 46.25%) than In NOBUNDSTACK (32.29%).
9 
 
Table 3:  Estimates of the actual response of the Stackelberg followers 
 
20 1 1
DD qq    
 N OBUNDSTACK B UNDSTACK 














* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The regressions include 
period and matching group dummies, for both intercept and slope parameters. These estimates are restricted to sum 
up to 0 in order to obtain the ‘true’ averages for 0 and 1 (Suits, 1984). 
 
    The conjecture that firm 2’s behavior changes if firm 1 bundles can also be illustrated 
when we consider the entire best reply function rather than merely the treatments’ average 
outputs and best reply frequencies. Previous Stackelberg experiments found that the Stackelberg 
followers produce more than predicted, essentially leading to a non-negatively sloped reaction 
curve (Huck et al. 2001, 2002). Table 3 contains the estimates of followers’ actual response 
function in our data. Recall that the standard best response function is given by 
21 1 ( ) 24 0.5 DD D qq q  . The estimated response function in treatment NOBUNDSTACK is much 
flatter than predicted. It appears that followers in this treatment employ a reward-and-
punishment scheme as the response function is below (above) the standard best response 
                                                 
9At first sight, another explanation could be that our experiments remove the possibility of an equal split. As has 
been observed (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Güth et al., 2001), this causes behavior to be more in line with what 
theory predicts. However, due to the additional monopoly market an equal split is not possible in both our bundling 
and no-bundling treatments..  16
function for low (high) leader quantities. On the other hand, in BUNDSTACK, the reaction curve is 
significantly negatively sloped with a magnitude consistent with the prediction of minus 0.5. 
    These findings suggest that the monopolists’ intentions matter (see Cox et al., 2007). 
Indeed, a non-bundling Stackelberg leader can freely earn monopoly rents in its home market 
and is not “forced” to produce the Stackelberg leader quantity on the duopoly market. 
Stackelberg leaders that bundle, however, create additional commitment power as it is more 
costly for them to give concessions in market D through output reductions. Put differently, 
Stackelberg-leader kind of behavior with bundling is not interpreted as hostile towards the 
duopolist. As a result, if the Stackelberg leader supplies a bundle, observed play is much closer 
to the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Product bundling is a strategy that allows dominant firms to leverage market power from one 
market to another market. Even though demand is independent across markets, the monopolist 
can credibly increase its market share in the duopolistic market at the expense of losing some 
customers in the monopolistic market (Martin, 1999, Nalebuff, 2004). 
    Our experimental treatments allow us to compare markets where the monopolist can 
bundle its two products to treatments where it cannot. As large payoff asymmetries result, 
bundling theory seems an unlikely candidate to survive an experimental test. Indeed, the single-
product firms produce more than predicted in all treatments. However, these deviations are often 
not significant and, overall, we find a surprising high degree of support for the theory of product 
bundling.  
    The degree of conformity with theory is particularly noticeable for one of the sequential-
move treatments we conduct. While standard Stackelberg duopoly theory by and large fails in 
the lab (Huck et al., 2001), the treatment with bundling leads to average outputs that are 
significantly closer to the prediction, even though in theory bundling should not make a 
difference here. Indeed, without bundling followers employ a reward-and-punishment scheme; 
with bundling followers’ reaction functions are significantly negatively sloped. We argue that 
this is because the followers perceive the intentions of a bundling monopolists as less hostile; 
they understand that any output reduction of the Stackelberg leader would come at a larger costs.   17
    A novel finding in the experimental literature is that our treatments without bundling 
basically replicate previous Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly experiments—even though in our 
design one firm earns additional (and substantial) monopoly payoffs. While at first sight this may 
seem to contradict models of inequality aversion, we argue that this finding is actually in line 
with models of inequality aversion. We were surprised to fail to find an experiment exploring the 
effect that a fixed additional payoff for one player has on inequality-driven behavior. Our current 
work in progress further investigates this issue in an ultimatum game where the proposer earns 
an additional amount of money regardless of the responders’ actions.  18
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Appendix A: Instructions 
Cournot - bundling 
 
Welcome! 
This is an experiment on market decision-making. Take the time to read carefully the instructions. A good 
understanding of the instructions and well thought out decisions during the experiment can earn you a 
considerable amount of money. All earnings from the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
Your role and task in the experiment 
In this experiment, you just like everybody else in the room will represent a firm. There are two types 
of firms, firm A and firm B. The computer randomly assigns half of the participants the role of firm A and 
the other half the role of firm B. Your role as firm A or firm B will remain fixed throughout the 
experiment, and you will learn whether you are firm A or firm B before we begin the experiment. 
 The experiment takes place over 15 rounds. In each round, one firm A and one firm B will meet in a 
market for a fictitious commodity, called Market 1. Firm A operates also in Market 2 but firm B does not.  
        The computer will randomly match two firms (one firm A, one firm B) for Market 1 in every round 
from a group of eight subjects. The matching is completely random, meaning that there is no relation 
between the participant you have been matched with last round (or any other previous round) and the 
participant to whom you will be assigned this round. 
In every period, firm A and firm B have to choose a quantity. This quantity can be any whole number 
between 1 and 19. Firm B’s choice applies to Market 1. Firm A’s quantity choice is relevant both in 
Market 1 as well as in Market 2. That is, firm A has only one quantity choice so that the quantity in 
Market 1 will be the same as the one in Market 2.  
Profit calculation 
    In the table we distributed, you can see how the profits for both firms are determined. Generally, the 
column on the left (“Market 2”) indicates the profit of firm A on Market 2 and the big payoff table 
(“Market 1”) indicates the profits for firm A and firm B in Market 1. 
    Market 1 
    In the payoff table for Market 1, the head of each row represents an A-firm’s quantity and the head of 
the column represents the quantity of the other firm (the B-firm). For each quantity combination (that is, 
for each of the firm A choices in the rows and the firm B choices in the columns), there is one relevant 
cell in the payoff table. In these cells, the lower left entry is firm A's profit and the upper right profit is 
firm B’s profit in Market 1. 
    Market 2 
    As mentioned, firm A also operates in Market 2. Firm A’s profit in Market 2 is contained in the second 
column of your table, the one with the title “Market 2”. The profit firm A earns in Market 2 is in addition 
to the profit it earns in Market 1. 
    At the end of each period, Firm A will be informed about the quantity choice of Firm B and Firm B 
will be informed about the quantity choice of Firm A, and the computer also calculates your profits.  22
 
Each period 
    In each of the 15 rounds, you and the other participant with whom you are randomly matched have to 
decide simultaneously about your quantities. That is, you have to pick your quantity without knowing 
what the other participants will choose. 
    At the end of each period, you will be informed about the quantity the other participant chose, and the 
computer also calculates your profits. 
Payments 
    The profits in the table are denoted in a fictitious unit of money which we call Florin. For each 500 
Florin, you (like all other participants) will be paid € 1 in cash at the end. 
    In the beginning of the experiment, we will pay you and the other participants 2500 Florin as an initial 
capital to start with (these are the € 5 show-up fee you were promised). Also these 2500 Florins will be 
paid in cash to you at the end. 
Questions? 
    If you have a question, please indicate that by raising your hand, and we will answer immediately and 
privately. 
 
Stackelberg - bundling 
 
Each period 
                In each of the 15 rounds, you and the other participant with whom you are randomly 
matched have to decide about your quantities. Firm A will decide about its quantity first. The 
computer will then inform Firm B about Firm A’s choice in Market 1 and Market 2, and then 
Firm B has to pick the quantity, knowing Firm A’s choice. (Firm B will not be informed about 
Firm A’s choice in Market 2.)  23
APPENDIX B: DATA 
Table B1:  1
D q  
  BundCour  NoBundCour 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  20.25  21.50  17.00 19.00 17.00 13.75 16.75 14.00 
2  20.25  20.50  18.00 17.75 17.00 16.00 16.50 13.75 
3  19.75  19.50  17.75 17.75 16.25 18.00 16.00 14.00 
4  20.25  20.00  18.00 19.75 17.00 16.75 19.50 12.75 
5  20.25  20.00  17.75 20.00 16.25 17.50 17.75 13.75 
6  21.00  20.00  18.25 20.50 17.75 17.25 18.50 13.50 
7  19.75  19.75  18.00 18.50 15.00 17.00 17.75 14.25 
8  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.25 16.75 17.75 18.50 14.75 
9  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.75 17.75 16.75 18.50 15.00 
10  19.00  20.00  18.75 18.75 16.75 15.50 16.50 14.50 
11  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.75 17.50 16.00 16.50 14.75 
12  20.25  19.25  19.25 19.00 17.25 16.75 18.50 14.75 
13  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 17.75 15.75 18.25 14.50 
14  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 17.00 15.75 15.75 15.25 
15  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 16.75 15.75 18.25 16.25 
  BundStack  NoBundStack 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  20.75  23.50  22.25 20.25 14.75 19.25 21.75 15.75 
2  20.50  22.75  21.75 21.25 17.50 19.25 19.50 16.25 
3  22.75  21.50  22.25 21.00 19.25 17.75 19.50 19.00 
4  22.25  23.00  22.50 21.75 21.50 18.75 20.25 22.00 
5  22.25  22.75  20.25 23.25 19.25 18.00 21.00 21.25 
6  21.50  22.50  21.50 22.00 18.50 19.25 20.25 20.00 
7  21.00  24.00  22.50 22.00 16.75 19.00 19.50 18.25 
8  23.25  22.75  22.25 21.50 17.00 18.50 19.50 19.25 
9  23.00  23.00  21.75 22.25 17.75 19.25 20.25 19.00 
10  23.00  22.00  22.75 22.00 17.00 20.00 19.50 21.25 
11  22.75  22.50  22.00 21.50 17.75 21.25 17.00 19.75 
12  22.25  22.00  21.25 21.00 17.75 19.75 19.50 19.00 
13  22.25  22.50  20.75 21.75 16.75 17.50 19.50 19.75 
14  22.50  22.50  21.75 22.25 17.75 20.25 19.50 19.00 
15  22.50  22.50  22.25 21.25 19.50 20.25 17.00 20.25  24
Table B2:  1
M q  
  BundCour  NoBundCour 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  16.00  17.25  15.50 15.00 17.00 17.25 15.75 17.25 
2  14.50  15.25  15.50 13.00 19.00 16.50 16.75 19.25 
3  14.25  17.25  16.00 12.50 17.50 17.00 18.00 17.00 
4  16.25  15.50  15.75 15.00 18.75 15.75 14.50 18.00 
5  16.75  14.75  15.50 13.25 17.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 
6  16.50  15.25  15.50 13.75 16.00 16.25 15.75 17.75 
7  16.25  15.25  15.50 14.25 15.75 16.25 16.00 17.25 
8  15.75  14.75  15.50 14.75 15.50 16.50 15.25 17.50 
9  16.75  16.00  15.25 13.00 16.25 16.25 16.50 17.50 
10  16.25  15.75  15.50 13.50 16.00 16.50 16.75 17.25 
11  17.75  15.75  16.25 14.75 17.50 16.50 16.50 16.75 
12  18.00  16.00  16.25 14.25 17.25 16.50 16.25 17.25 
13  16.25  15.25  15.50 15.50 17.50 15.50 15.75 17.50 
14  18.25  15.25  15.50 14.25 17.75 16.00 16.00 17.25 
15  16.00  14.25  16.25 14.25 17.50 15.75 17.50 17.25 
  BundStack  NoBundStack 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  13.50  11.50  12.00 15.25 15.25 12.75 14.50 14.50 
2  14.00  12.50  15.00 13.50 16.50 12.25 14.75 16.75 
3  12.75  13.25  16.25 12.25 14.50 14.25 14.25 15.75 
4  13.00  12.50  14.75 12.50 13.75 16.00 14.75 16.75 
5  13.00  15.25  15.50 11.75 19.00 14.25 16.00 13.25 
6  13.25  12.75  16.75 12.25 18.00 14.75 17.75 13.25 
7  13.50  12.00  14.00 15.50 15.25 17.25 18.50 16.00 
8  12.50  12.50  15.25 12.25 18.00 14.50 18.50 18.00 
9  12.50  12.75  16.25 12.25 15.25 14.00 17.75 18.25 
10  12.50  13.00  16.25 12.50 18.00 14.00 17.25 15.75 
11  12.75  13.00  16.00 12.25 15.50 13.50 18.50 14.00 
12  12.75  13.50  16.50 12.75 14.75 14.75 14.25 15.50 
13  12.75  13.25  15.50 12.75 13.75 15.75 16.50 14.25 
14  12.75  13.25  17.25 12.25 17.75 14.50 16.50 15.75 
15  12.75  13.25  16.75 13.00 14.75 13.75 13.25 17.50  25
 Table B3:  2
D q  
  BundCour  NoBundCour 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  20.25  21.50  17.00 19.00 24.00 26.00 25.25 21.00 
2  20.25  20.50  18.00 17.75 24.00 25.75 24.25 24.25 
3  19.75  19.50  17.75 17.75 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
4  20.25  20.00  18.00 19.75 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
5  20.25  20.00  17.75 20.00 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
6  21.00  20.00  18.25 20.50 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
7  19.75  19.75  18.00 18.50 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
8  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.25 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
9  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.75 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
10  19.00  20.00  18.75 18.75 24.00 25.50 24.50 24.00 
11  20.25  19.50  19.25 19.75 24.00 24.75 24.50 24.00 
12  20.25  19.25  19.25 19.00 24.00 24.75 24.50 24.00 
13  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 24.00 24.75 24.50 24.00 
14  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 24.00 24.75 24.50 24.00 
15  20.25  19.75  19.25 19.00 24.00 24.75 24.50 24.00 
  BundStack  NoBundStack 
matching group 
period 
1  2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  20.75  23.50  22.25 20.25 22.75 21.75 22.25 25.00 
2  20.50  22.75  21.75 21.25 24.00 22.75 23.75 24.75 
3  22.75  21.50  22.25 21.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 23.75 
4  22.25  23.00  22.50 21.75 24.00 24.25 24.00 25.50 
5  22.25  22.75  20.25 23.25 24.00 24.75 24.00 24.00 
6  21.50  22.50  21.50 22.00 24.00 23.50 24.00 24.75 
7  21.00  24.00  22.50 22.00 24.00 24.25 24.00 23.75 
8  23.25  22.75  22.25 21.50 24.00 24.25 24.00 23.25 
9  23.00  23.00  21.75 22.25 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.25 
10  23.00  22.00  22.75 22.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.75 
11  22.75  22.50  22.00 21.50 24.00 23.50 24.00 24.75 
12  22.25  22.00  21.25 21.00 24.00 22.75 24.00 25.25 
13  22.25  22.50  20.75 21.75 24.00 22.50 24.00 23.50 
14  22.50  22.50  21.75 22.25 24.00 24.00 24.00 23.50 
15  22.50  22.50  22.25 21.25 24.00 23.50 24.00 24.00 
 
 